China has a well-deserved reputation for uniting its people behind the sense of a common enemy, but it is far from alone. In the UK, Margaret Thatcher polled as the most unpopular Prime Minister in British history early in her first term, but achieved a landslide victory in the following election thanks to the unifying influence of the Falklands war. Similarly, it's far from surprising that Beijing—with such a powerful tool available and with a population made fractious by the disruption and confusion of huge social and economic transitions—should have chosen to wield its "nationalism" tool as a distraction, bringing the people together under its leadership with frequent suggestions of a common foe beyond the nation's borders. However, this tool of government to incite fervent nationalism amongst the masses– like any other tool – has to be used with prudence lest it cut off the fingers of the user. It may be that, through emotionally involving the citizenry in areas of dispute, Beijing has inadvertently put crucial areas of foreign policy into the hands of the people and limited its own room for maneuver.

Social media and the (unsupervised) spread of nationalism

The influence of the Internet has made such nationalist fervor still more difficult to control. In 2005, the last time major anti-Japanese sentiment broke out across China, far fewer people used the Internet, and Weibo—the Chinese equivalent of Twitter—did not yet exist. Weibo in particular has become a forum in which ideas can be born to grow to massive proportions in a short period of time as people share their ideas and spread them and Beijing has frequently had to intervene when some unfavorable sentiment or speculation, news report or assertion has gone viral. Where previously the patriotic sentiments may have lain dormant within the populace awaiting activation from Beijing through news reports and broadcasts on CCTV, those sentiments may now be self-activating. When news broke that the Japanese government had purchased several of the Diaoyu Islands from private ownership—a historically complicated and long contentious issue for both countries—Weibo played a big role in building the angered response, a response no longer susceptible to fine-tuning from Beijing. Through communication with one another, the citizenry's anger escalated into rioting, violence, vandalism and even looting, surely not a situation Beijing wanted. Nor could they have wanted the perceived risk to Japanese citizens in China being severe enough for them to be warned by the Japanese government to remain in their homes or for Japanese businesses to close down for fear of being attacked. In fact, in the days since the anti-Japanese demonstrations began, they've actually tried to reel it back in a bit, asking Weibo users to help identify demonstrators suspected of property damage in several cities and temporarily closing down the subway station near the Japanese embassy in Beijing to limit accessibility by demonstrators. With Japan a crucial trading partner, the perception of risk from latent anger is sure to affect future Japanese inward investment and thus the health of the economy in difficult times.

The trouble of mixing foreign policy and national pride

To take the UK as an example again, there can be little doubt that were the British government to hand the Falkland Islands over to the Argentinians it would provoke national outrage. What, however, if it were to hand Gibraltar over to the Spanish? Probably little. What, too, of the poll under Tony Blair that may have permitted Scotland and Wales their departure from the union or the Good Friday agreement that has seen the UK and Ireland take joint government over Northern Ireland? By not making Gibraltar or the integrity of the UK as it currently stands matters of national pride, the British government is able to deal with national and foreign policy in these areas as it sees fit.

Beijing does not have this maneuverability when it comes to the South China Seas. The nations disputing the fishing and mineral rights of the area must come to some measure of accord before those resources may be exploited by any of them. However, China is not alone in having made the dispute an emotional issue for its citizenry—Japanese politicians are notorious for their off-color remarks and publicized visits to war memorials.  And on September 22, hundreds of Japanese marched through downtown Tokyo protesting China's claims to the islands, although the whole affair was smaller and more subdued.

The response of the Chinese people to their government, should they reach a compromise now, has to be taken into account as well. How would the Chinese people respond to"Chinese" oil making its way to Japanese refineries if the resources surrounding the islands were shared for example? Far from unifying the people under the government in the face of a common foe, the real danger is that the government itself would be perceived as weak for "giving away what is rightfully China's". The genie of nationalism, once useful, has now taken on a life of its own. It will be difficult to encourage, cajole or ram it back into its bottle, and while it's on the loose, its behavior will be as unpredictable as it is powerful.
 

Related links
Something Fishy Going on: Anti-Japanese Demonstrations Erupt Across China
New Survey of Sino-Japanese Relations Shows a Lack of Love
Opinion: Chinese Media Should not Mislead Public on Foreign Affairs

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Keywords: Anti-Japanese demonstrations Diaoyu islands conflict Chinese nationalism